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Introduction.  This article discusses the controversy 
related to the detention and rendition by US authorities 
of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen.  The Arar case is par-
ticularly significant because of the intense publicity, de-
bate, and mobilization that it has engendered in Canada.  
This case illustrates problems posed by the expectations 
and practices of information sharing in Canada – US se-
curity cooperation.  
Maher Arar holds dual Canadian-Syrian citizenship.  
In September 2002, he was detained by American au-
thorities in New York, while traveling back to Canada 
from Tunisia.  US officials questioned Arar on suspected, 
but never proven, links to Al-Qaeda and then deported 
him to Syria.  Arar was returned to Canada from Syria in 
late 2003.  A public outcry about Arar’s rendition eventu-
ally led to the formation of an official Commission of 
Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation 
to Maher Arar.  In September 2006, Justice Dennis 
O'Connor, who headed the inquiry, ruled that there was 
no evidence that Arar was ever linked to extremist groups 
or was a threat to Canada's national security.  He faulted 
Canadian, Syrian and American agencies and called upon 
the Canadian government to lodge a formal complaint 
with the American authorities on the issue.  On January 
26, 2007, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued 
a formal apology to Maher Arar while announcing that he 
will receive C$12.5 million in compensation.  In line with 
the recommendations of the Arar Commission, the Cana-
dian government has filed protests with the US and Syria 
about Arar’s treatment.  With the help of New York-
based The Center for Constitutional Rights, Arar also 
filed a lawsuit against the US government.1 
Arar’s case has led to some tension between the US 
and Canada.  The Canadian government has requested 
that Arar be removed from the US terrorist watch list.  
US authorities have not acceded to this, arguing that the 
decision to keep Arar on the US watch list is 
“appropriate” and based on independent information 
collected by American agencies.2  Canadian authorities 
have also been unhappy with the reluctance of the 
Americans to share information on the case with them, a 
point raised by the Arar Report.3  The case could have a 
significant impact on the nature and extent of Canada – 
US cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. 
The American practice of extraordinary rendition has 
generated significant domestic and international contro-
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versy.  It has come under particular scrutiny from some 
of the closest allies of the United States, including Euro-
pean countries and Canada.  In general, the practice of 
extradition is a formal, legal process through which a per-
son suspected of involvement in illegal activities, includ-
ing terrorism, can be transferred from one country to an-
other.  Extraordinary or irregular rendition refers to the ex-
trajudicial transfer of persons.  It occurs when one coun-
try apprehends a person and then transfers him to a third 
country.  Under such circumstances, the detainee usually 
does not have access to the judicial system of the state 
which apprehended and transferred him.  This practice 
has become particularly controversial because of allega-
tions that the US government has participated in the 
transfer of terrorism suspects to countries (such as Syria) 
that are known to use torture.  Arguably, various interna-
tional treaties and conventions, such as the UN Conven-
tion against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment and the Geneva Con-
ventions, prohibit, or greatly restrict, extraordinary rendi-
tion.  On the other hand, some have argued that excep-
tions do exist to this prohibition.  The current US ad-
ministration has conceded that it has rendered suspects 
to countries that are known to practice torture; it, has 
however, denied the allegation that it has sent the sus-
pects for the purpose of torture.4  Some of the debate 
around the Arar case involves the issue of extraordinary 
rendition.  However, as discussed below, other significant 
issues in Canada – US intelligence cooperation have also 
been highlighted.  
The primary source of information for this article is 
the Arar Commission.5  The Commission was established 
in early 2004 to undertake two primary tasks.  First, Jus-
tice O’Connor would investigate the actions of Canadian 
officials in relation to Arar’s detention and deportation.  
Second, because the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) was the primary agency involved in this case, he 
would make recommendations on a review mechanism 
for its activities with respect to national security.  In other 
words, there was a factual component to the investiga-
tion, as well as a long-term policy dimension.  The Com-
mission released its findings between September and De-
cember 2006.  It should be noted that the Arar Commis-
sion invited the governments of the United States, Jordan 
and Syria to participate in the hearings; but all three par-
ties declined.  The findings of the Report are based on 
any clear or substantive evidence linking Arar to illegal 
activities, he was incarcerated and tortured for over a year 
on suspected terrorist links. 
Information Sharing between the US and Can-
ada.  The Arar Report investigates, in detail, the circum-
stances leading to Arar’s detention and rendition.  It con-
cludes that, contrary to comments made by American 
officials, Canadian officials were not involved with Arar’s 
detention and rendition.  At the same time, the informa-
tion provided by the RCMP did play a critical role in the 
decisions made by American authorities.  Justice O’Con-
nor was particularly concerned about this and recom-
mended changes to the information sharing process to 
prevent a recurrence of this situation.      
Justice O’Connor was particularly critical of the fact 
that the RCMP made several inaccurate and baseless 
statements about Arar and his wife to the American au-
thorities.  This included alleging, without supporting evi-
dence, that they were linked to Al-Qaeda.  Several other 
problems were also found in the processes governing Ca-
nadian cooperation with the 
US.  First, information was 
shared without attaching writ-
ten caveats, in contravention of 
conventional RCMP policy.  
The absence of caveats could 
increase the risk that the infor-
mation would be used by the 
receiving party for purposes 
that violates Canadian practices 
or values.  The rendition of a 
Canadian citizen to Syria with-
out the approval of Canadian 
authorities was just such a 
situation.  Second, in April 
2002, the Canadian authorities provided American agen-
cies with its entire investigative database, in the form of 
three compact discs, without screening the information 
beforehand or attaching written caveats.  This, too, was 
faulted by the Arar Commission.   
Justice O’Connor believes that these errors were 
committed because the officers assigned to the counter-
terrorism investigations had inadequate training.  While 
he believes that prompt information sharing and other 
forms of transnational cooperation were, and continue to 
be, crucially important; so is proper training and due dili-
gence.6  The Report acknowledges that information shar-
ing across countries is necessary in order to deal with 
transnational organizations such as Al-Qaeda. At the 
same time, such cooperation must include a great deal of 
circumspection and careful consideration of the use to 
which the information will be put.  For example, infor-
mation shared with an agency or country that is known to 
the testimonies and written evidence of Canadians in-
volved or familiar with the case. 
The Surveillance, Detention, and Rendition of 
Maher Arar.  Soon after the attacks of 9/11, Canadian 
and American law enforcement and security authorities 
met in order to generate greater cooperation in anti-
terrorism activities.  Canadian agencies were asked to in-
vestigate individuals in Canada who allegedly had ties to 
suspected terrorists.  In early October 2001, the RCMP 
began investigating Abdullah Almalki, who was believed 
to be connected to Al-Qaeda.  Arar entered the RCMP’s 
investigations on October 12, 2002, when he was wit-
nessed meeting Almalki in Ottawa.  
Maher Arar was born in Syria and arrived in Canada 
on September 1, 1987.  He obtained his Canadian citizen-
ship on September 28, 1995.  Arar holds a graduate de-
gree in telecommunications and was employed as a com-
munications engineer with The MathWorks, Inc., in Na-
tick, Massachusetts.  He had both an American and a Ca-
nadian social security number and was a frequent traveler 
between the two countries.  After 
he was seen meeting Almalki, 
Canadian authorities put him un-
der occasional surveillance and 
financial scrutiny.  They also con-
tacted U.S. Customs, the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) and the FBI about 
him.  
On September 26, 2002, 
while passing through John F. 
Kennedy International Airport in 
New York on his way to Canada, 
Arar was detained by American 
officials.  On October 7, 2002, 
the Regional Director of the INS issued an order finding 
Arar to be a member of Al-Qaeda and directing his re-
moval from the United States.  He was then flown to Jor-
dan and eventually taken to Syria, where he was impris-
oned for almost a year.  He returned to Canada after his 
release on October 5, 2003. 
 Based on evidence provided by Arar and extensive 
testimony by human-rights experts, the Arar Report con-
cluded that Arar was tortured during his imprisonment in 
Syria.  In addition, the Commission concluded that there 
was no evidence to suggest that Arar’s activities consti-
tuted a threat to the security of Canada.  The report 
noted that he was never charged with any offence in Can-
ada, the United States or Syria.  Arar appeared to be, for 
the duration of the RCMP's investigations, a “person of 
interest” (someone whose role and complicity is not 
clear), rather than someone about whom criminal evi-
dence is being collected.  In sum, despite the absence of 
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… I strongly endorse the importance of  
information sharing. Sharing informa-
tion across borders is essential for pro-
tecting Canada’s national security inter-
ests, in that it allows more complete and 
accurate assessments of  threats to our 
security…   However, information 
must be shared in a principled and re-
sponsible manner.      (Arar Report, p. 22) 
security personnel be trained in information sharing prac-
tices and be told that there processes should comply with 
privacy laws. 
Policy implications.  The Arar case has significant 
policy implications, both specific to Canada – US rela-
tions and to the broader issue of transnational coopera-
tion in security.  The Arar Report underlines the impor-
tance of continued close cooperation between the US and 
Canada in counterterrorism efforts.  Justice O’Connor 
cites the findings of both the American 9/11 Report and 
the Canadian report on the Air India bombing in 1985 to 
support this view.8  Both documents stress the need for 
intelligence sharing in security matters. Productive coop-
eration is reflected in the Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams (IBETs), which enable the RCMP, Canada Border 
Services, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to work 
together. 
The cooperative and interdependent dimensions of 
Canada – US relations do not, however, mitigate the con-
cerns that arose out of the Arar case.  The Report is criti-
cal of the way in which the Americans treated Arar.  In 
addition, Canadians are unhappy with the reluctance of 
the American to cooperate with the Canadian inquiry into 
the case.  Justice O’Connor and the RCMP seem strongly 
opposed to the practice of extraordinary rendition, an 
opinion that is likely shared by many Canadians.  
Justice O’Connor notes that, since the Arar case, the 
RCMP has developed a greater sensitivity to, and aware-
ness, of the risks to Canadians accused of links to Al-
Qaeda when they are in the United States.  It is not clear 
how, specifically, this sensitivity and awareness has trans-
lated to actual action.  Nonetheless, it is likely that Cana-
dian authorities will in the future be far more cautious in 
cooperating with the US in investigating Canadian citi-
zens.    
Do these developments indicate reluctance, in the 
future, to engage in bilateral security cooperation?  The 
answer to this question would be “no.”  Canada and the 
US both recognize that intelligence sharing is necessary 
for effective counterterrorism activities.  The Arar case 
demonstrates, however, that cooperation and coordina-
tion, even between close allies, can create tension points.  
This is because one party may engage in actions that 
compromise the laws, practices and protocols of the 
other.  As the Arar Commission points out, such situa-
tions point to the need for checks and procedures to 
monitor information exchange and use.  At the same 
time, oversight protocols should not undermine expedi-
ency and effectiveness in the overall effort.  Many experts 
endorse the suggestion that the need for efficiency in in-
telligence sharing must be balanced with a continuing em-
use torture, such as Syria, might affect Canada’s commit-
ment to the global prevention of torture.  The Justice also 
expressed concern about possible Canadian involvement 
in the American policy of rendition, a practice to which 
Canada seems opposed.   
The Report makes some key recommendations to 
correct the mistakes made by Canadian authorities in the 
Arar case.  These recommendations are relevant to infor-
mation sharing between Canada and the US in both di-
rections.  First, written protocols that clarify the process 
of cross-border information sharing are necessary to en-
sure greater accountability.  Implicit or verbal agreements 
with foreign agencies should be avoided.  Second, coop-
erative arrangements should be subject to periodic review 
to ensure prompt attention to problems such as those 
that arose during the Arar case.  In addition, sensitivity to 
cultural and human rights issues should be an essential 
component of training in national security matters, par-
ticularly in relation to Muslim and Arab communities.  It 
is possible that the need to formulate and follow protocol 
was minimized in the post-9/11 crisis mode.  Future 
cross-border information sharing should be predicated 
upon clear procedural guidelines.   
The treatment to which Arar was subjected in Syria 
was of particular concern to the Commission.  Justice 
O’Connor was categorical in stating that the use of tor-
ture “can never be legally justified.”7  It is worth noting 
that Canada is one of the leading advocates of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, and is a signatory to several in-
ternational treaties prohibiting the use of torture, includ-
ing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Ge-
neva Conventions, the United Nations Torture Declara-
tion and the Convention Against Torture.  In addition, 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms clearly re-
jects the use of torture.  O’Connor believes that informa-
tion should not be shared with a foreign country if there 
is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute to the use 
of torture.  Information sharing policies should include 
specific directions aimed at eliminating any possible Ca-
nadian complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other 
human rights abuses and ensuring accountability.  
Another major concern of the Arar Report was the 
impact of Canada – US cooperation on Canadian privacy 
laws.  Justice O’Connor noted at several points in the Re-
port that the RCMP provided information to American 
authorities that did not comply with Canadian policies on 
sharing information and screening processes.  In particu-
lar, the Report was concerned with the Canadian authori-
ties’ decision to provide the Americans with its entire da-
tabase of investigations.  The Report emphasizes the fact 
that need for security cooperation must be counterbal-
anced with the importance to protecting the privacy of 
Canadian citizens. Justice O’Connor recommended that 
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Endnotes 
1. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation provides a detailed 
time line on the case. See http://www.cbc.ca/news/
background/arar/ 
2. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/Chertoff-Gonzales-
letter-to-Day.pdf 
3. See Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006. "Arar Report 
Puts US 'Rendition' Policy Into Spotlight." Accessible at http://
www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/09/20/arar-reaction.html 
4. In April 2006, the Congressional Research Service released a 
report for the United States Congress entitled “Renditions: Con-
straints Imposed by Laws on Torture.” See http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL32890.pdf 
5. The full version of the report can be found at http://
www.ararcommission.ca. Unless otherwise noted, information 
provided in this report is gleaned from the Commission’s find-
ings.  
6. Note that Justice O’Connor was also critical of internal deci-
sions and actions made by Canadian officials. For example, the 
report says that Canadian authorities leaked confidential and 
sometimes inaccurate information about the case to the media in 
order to discredit Arar and protect government interests.  
7. Note that the use of torture in efforts to combat terrorism has 
been subject to some debate and contention in the United 
States. O’Connor’s report has no such equivocation on the is-
sue.  
8. The 9/11 Commission Report is available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/. The Air India Report is available at http://
www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/airs/_fl/rep1-en.pdf 
9. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Canada_6.pdf  
10. http://www.ifpa.org/confwrkshp/canadawkshp/wrkshp.htm  
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phasis on following established procedures.9  Achieving 
such a balance is challenging, but necessary.  One sugges-
tion has been the creation of a bilateral organization, con-
sisting of officials from both countries, which would 
oversee intelligence and information sharing.10  Under the 
doctrine of sovereignty, it is certainly the right of both 
countries to refrain from sharing information that per-
tains to national security or the privacy of citizens.  
Shared security goals, however, necessitate close collabo-
ration in the development and exchange of intelligence.  
Officials in both countries need to develop better prac-
tices and institutions to achieve this goal. 
 
* Bidisha Biswas is an assistant professor of political 
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